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Introduction
In the mid-1930s the lawyer and political scientist Karl Loewenstein made the argu-
ment that the dictatorships of Europe were only temporary phenomena, because the 
process of modernization leading from autocracy to democracy was irreversible1. In 
contrast, Diana Spearman perplexedly assessed in 1939 that authoritarian forms of 
rule even possessed a higher fascination under modern conditions than freedom did. 
Th is experience of the 1920s and 1930s was repeated at the end of the 1940s and at 
the beginning of the 1950s. Namely, the U.S.A. had to recognize that their concept of 
freedom was being set under pressure in the realm of foreign politics by the growing 
attractiveness of the communist gospel. Finally, aft er the breakdown of the Eastern 
bloc, the Western World only experienced a very short triumph. How the theoreti-
cal concepts of “Political Religion”, “Permanent Revolution” and “Totalitarianism” did 
explain these phenomena in the 20th century, and do we have a deeper insight today?
“Political Religions”
Th e enthusiasm that was shown by large portions of the population in the eff ected 
countries for dictatorial systems and their ideologies led people in the 1920s and 
1930s to draw analogies between ideologies and classical religions. Just as Bertrand 
Russell already in 1920 considered bolshevism to be a new religion2, John Maynard 
Keynes said in 1925 that, like other religions, Leninism also had no scruples3; others 
labelled communism a “religion in disguise”4, spoke of National Socialism in terms of 
“political messianism”5, or of “replacement religion”6. Th e Methodist Bishop, John L. 
Nuelsen from the U.S.A., wrote in 1938: “Hitlerism cannot be understood when one 
1 See also G. Besier, Political Religion, Totalitarianism and Modern Dictatorships, „Politeja” 2 (8), 2007, 
pp. 21–48.
2 B. Russell, Th e Practice and Th eory of Bolshevism, London 1920.
3 J. Maynard Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, New York 1965, p. 4. 
4 C. Christian Bry, Verkappte Religionen, Lochham 31964, p. 167.
5 D. Glufk e, R. Karwehl, «Politisches Messiastum». Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kirche und 
Nationalsozialismus, Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft  für niedersächsische Kirchengeschichte, Vol. 90, 1992, pp. 207–217.
6 H. Maier, „Politische Religionen” – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Begriff s, in: „Totalitarismus” und „poli-
tische Religionen”. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs, idem, M. Schäfer (eds.), Paderborn 1997, p. 304. 
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simply understands it as a political or social movement. It is a religion. It is certainly 
not a Christian religion, but a religion all the same. […] Hitlerism is certainly not just 
a religion; rather it is an organized church.”7 Two years before this the Swiss ecume-
nist, Adolf Keller, described Mussolini: “the leader, el Duce, is the nation personifi ed, 
a superman, a messiah, a rescuer”8. 
Although the various patterns of interpretation of dictatorships as political reli-
gions did not play a distinguished role in the discussion of the 1930s, nevertheless 
the religious approach and the use of the vocabulary of Christianity were common 
practices of the early criticism of dictatorships9.
Communism and National Socialism10 have competed with the model of 
a Christian revelation religion, as they promise to minimize the contingencies of hu-
man life – seen as primarily caused by repression – through an enormous political 
restructuring, and, in so doing, to reveal or even to devaluate the function of classical 
religion: system stabilization. “Eternal peace will reign, where in the face of future 
abundance no one has to fear not to get enough. Under circumstances of abundance 
every reasonable desire and need can be met”11. In dealing with the question of truth, 
Marxism-Leninism tried to outperform religious explanations by labelling the com-
plex of its theory, dialectical and historical materialism, as “scientifi c philosophy”, 
a “scientifi c world-view”, or a “scientifi c theory”, “which discovered the objective laws 
of social development”12. 
As is well-known, the concepts of “political religion” or “secular religion” already 
appeared in the 1930s13 especially in the conception of the Austrian mindset-historian 
Lucie Varga14, the historical-philosopher Eric Voegelin (Vienna)15, the French soci-
ologist Raymond Aron (Paris)16 and the British journalist Frederick Augustus Voigt17. 
7 J. Nuelsen, Religion and Church in Hitler’s Germany, „Th e Christian Advocate”, November 17, 1938.
8 A. Keller, Church and State on the European Continent, London 1936, p. 59. Cf. M. Jehle-Wildberger, Adolf 
Keller (1872–1963). Pionier der ökumenischen Bewegung, Zürich 2008, pp. 353 ff .
9 G. Stanton Ford (ed.), Dictatorship in the Modern World, Minneapolis 1935; B. Lavergne, Die totalitären 
Staaten oder der Rückfall Europas in das 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (1937), Wege der Totalitarismus-Forschung, in: 
B. Seidel, S. Jenkner (eds.), Darmstadt 1968, pp. 64–85.
10 Concerning the methodological problems of the comparison, see: D. Nohlen, Vergleichende Methode, 
in: Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft . Th eorien, Methoden, Begriff e, idem, R.-O. Schultze (eds.), München 2002, 
pp. 1020–1031. From a historic viewpoint, see: H. Möller, Diktatur- und Demokratieforschung im 20. Jahrhundert, 
„Vierteljahresheft e für Zeitgeschichte”, Vol. 51, 2003, pp. 29–50.
11 H. Lübbe, Freiheit statt Emanzipationszwang. Die liberalen Traditionen und das Ende der marxistischen 
Illusion, Zürich 1991, p. 92; see also: T. Todorov, Totalitarianism. Between Religion and Science, „Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions”, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 28–42.
12 M. Buhr, A. Kosing, Kleines Wörterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Philosphie, Berlin (East) 31975, p. 173.
13 M. Huttner, Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen. Zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriff s- 
und Th eoriebildung in Großbritannien, Bonn 1999, pp. 255–259.
14 L. Varga, Zeitenwende. Mentalitätshistorische Studien 1936–1939, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 115. 
15 E. Voegelin, Die Politischen Religionen, Wien 1938; D. Herz, Die politischen Religionen im Werk Eric 
Voegelins, in: „Totalitarismus” und „politische Religionen”, pp. 191–209; M. Huttner, Totalitarismus und säkulare 
Religionen, p. 145; M. Henkel, Konservativismus im politischen Denken Eric Voegelins. Überlegungen zum Problem 
der Verortung seines Ansatzes, München 2001, p. 9. 
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1617“Interest in political religions experiences has a renaissance in several countries 
at this time”, wrote the British historian, Michael Burleigh a few years ago18. Richard 
Steigmann-Gall, a historian in the United States, ascribed the resurgence of the par-
adigm to the culturalistic Turn, but believed that National Socialism could best be 
understood as “religious politics”19. In Germany a far-reaching research project on 
the general theme of “totalitarianism and political religion” was undertaken in the 
1990s, initiated and led by Hans Maier20. Th is new project brought the two concepts 
“totalitarianism” and “political religion” together again. Th e results of Maier’s research 
project, which was released in three volumes, mirror the ambivalence of political reli-
gions21. On the one side they exhibited “phenomena similar to religions”, on the other 
they behaved in ways that are decidedly “anti-church” and “anti-religious”22. But this 
result might be not so surprising aft er all because modern ideologies do compete with 
traditional religions, and vice versa. It is because of this ambiguity as well as due to 
diff erent understandings of religion, that it is still debated, whether dictatorial sys-
tems of the twentieth century should truly be called political religions23.
16 B. Gess, Die Totalitarismuskonzeption von Raymond Aron und Hannah Arendt, in: „Totalitarismus” und 
„politische Religionen”, p. 265; H. Seubert, Erinnerung an den „Engagierten Beobachter” in veränderter Zeit. Über 
Raymond Aron als Th eoretiker des Totalitarismus und der nuklearen Weltlage, in: „Totalitarismus” und „poli-
tische Religionen”, p. 322; M. Huttner, „Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen”, p. 152, T.M. Kjeldahl, Defence of 
a Concept. Raymond Aron and Totalitarism, „Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions”, Vol. 2, 2001, pp. 
121–142; M. Oppermann, Raymond Aron und Deutschland. Die Verteidigung der Freiheit und das Problem des 
Totalitarismus, Ostfi ldern 2008.
17 M. Huttner, Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen, p. 99.
18 M. Burleigh, Das Zeitalter des Nationalsozialismus. Eine Gesamtdarstellung, Frankfurt am Main 2000, 
p. 25. See also: P. Burrin, Political Religion. Th e Relevance of a Concept, „History and Memory”, Vol. 9, 1997, 
pp. 321–352. E. Gentile, Th e Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy, London 1996, does for the comparison of 
almost religious ideologies not use the criterion “political religion”, but instead “civil religion”. See in this regard 
also: Idem, Politics as Religion, Princeton 2006; Idem, Th e Sacralization of Politics. Defi nitions, Interpretations 
and Refl ections in the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism, „Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions”, Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 18–55; S. di Renzo, Th e Non-Optional Basis of Religion, „Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions”, Vol. 3, 2002, pp. 75–98.
19 R. Steigmann-Gall, Nazism and the Revival of Political Religion Th eory, „Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions”, Vol. 5, 2004, pp. 376–398.
20 See also: P. Steinbach, Die totalitäre Weltanschauungsdiktatur des 20. Jahrhunderts als Ausdruck „Politischer 
Religion” und als Bezugspunkt des antitotalitären Widerstands, „Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte”, Vol. 12, 1999, pp. 20–
–46; and also: Wolfgang Dierker, Himmlers Glaubenskrieger. Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS und seine Religionspolitik 
1933–1941, Paderborn 2002, pp. 539–549, who empirically shows for the religion policy of the Sicherheitsdienst 
(Security Service) the “specifi c interaction of ideology and practice” (p. 540), and aims to interpret its fi ndings 
with the concept of “political religions” (p. 545). 
21 H. Maier (ed.), Vol 1: „Totalitarismus” und „politische Religionen”, Paderborn, 1996. Idem, M. Schäfer 
(eds.), Vol 2: „Totalitarismus” und „politische Religionen”. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs (1997). H. Maier (ed.), 
Totalitarismus” und Politische Religion. Vol. 3: Deutungsgeschichte und Th eorie (2003).
22 H. Maier, M. Schäfer, „Totalitarismus und „politische Religionen”, p. 13. 
23 Compare, e.g., the very diff erent conceptions on National Socialism of Hans Mommsen and Julius 
H. Schoeps, among others, in: Zwischen „nationaler Revolution” und militärischer Aggression. Transformationen in 
Kirche und Gesellschaft  während der konsolidierten NS-Gewaltherrschaft  (1934–1939), G. Besier (ed.), München 
2001. See also H. Maier, Deutungen totalitärer Herrschaft  1919–1989, „Vierteljahresheft e für Zeitgeschichte”, Vol. 
50, 2002, pp. 349–366.
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In order to create a new loyalty and to awaken excitement for the system, the 
young dictatorships used symbols, rituals, productions, parties, celebrations, memo-
rials, memorial and celebratory events as well as central buildings and monuments, 
which implied strength. Th is is true for the Bolsheviks24 as well as for the National 
Socialists25 and the Fascists26. Th ese arrangements not only carried away the actors 
themselves, but also sympathizers, nominal members and sometimes even oppo-
nents. Almost no one was able to evade the fascination of creating a new society and 
new, self-transcendent men, being allowed to dream of a redeemed existence, unless 
one was excluded from these fi nal aspirations because of one’s blood line – as the Jews 
– and was hence not allowed to take part in the revolution of life. Most symbolic for 
the decision to leave the old behind and start a new reality was the announcement of 
a new calendar. 
Th e personality cult that was borrowed from religious tradition and revolved 
around a revolutionary superhuman, who one could thank for the own exaltation, 
was at its highest in Lenin’s case, whose followers tried to make him “immortal” by 
mummifying him27. In contrast to the glorifi ed Lenin stands, the case of Mussolini, 
the toppled and reviled leader, whose corpse was presented to the mob in the market-
place in Milan, what also has quasi-religious meaning. Hitler wanted to prevent such 
a downfall by ordering that his corpse should be cremated.
Widely disseminated hagiographical depictions of the movement as well as its 
leader and holy books, which were given away at weddings and other special events, 
were designed to provide the quasi-religious institutions and the people with an aura 
of infallibility28. On top of the book production was the holy doctrine itself, for which 
one was willing to withstand hunger, repression, violence and terror as a concomi-
tant to the wonderful. One can not only see analogies here to religious history, but 
also between dictatorships. “Even though they are contrary in their contents, national 
socialist and Stalinist ideologies converged by justifying every sacrifi ce during their 
realization and the ability to commit in disregard of humanity. In this sense, they were 
connected as functional equivalents”29. Th ere is an entire list of common religious 
characteristics, such as the cadre’s “need for deliverance”, the establishment of rituals 
and celebrations, the creation of symbols, the staging of cultural worship as well as the 
justifi cation of destitution and cruelty. 
Th e main objection against the model of “secular religion” is that it does not pro-
vide any specifi c characterization of the dictatorships of the 20th century. Th e French 
24 K.-G. Riegel, Der Maxismus-Leninismus als „politische Religion”, in: Politische Religion und Religionspolitik. 
Zwischen Totalitarismus und Bürgerfreiheit, G. Besier, H. Lübbe (eds.), Göttingen 2005, pp. 15–48. 
25 C.-E. Bärsch, Der Nationalsozialismus als „politische Religion” und die „Volksgemeinschaft ”, in: Politische 
Religion und Religionspolitik, G. Besier, H. Lübbe (eds.), pp. 49–78.
26 E. Gentile, Der Liktorenkult, in: Faschismus und Faschismen im Vergleich, Ch. Dipper, R. Hudemann, 
J. Petersen (eds.),Vierow 1998, pp. 247–262.
27 N. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! Th e Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, Harvard 1983, p. 165.
28 O. Plöckinger, Geschichte eines Buches. Adolf Hitlers „Mein Kampf” 1922–1945, München 2006, p. 405.
29 M. Hildermeier, Kommunismus und Stalinismus: „Säkularisierte Religion” oder totalitäre Ideologie?, in: 
Zwischen Politik und Religion. Studien zur Entstehung, Existenz und Wirkung des Totalitarismus, K. Hildebrand 
(ed.), München 2003, pp. 91–111; here: p. 109.
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Revolution and nationalism were also clothed in quasi-religious garb30. Moreover, 
what must be remembered, is that the concept of “political religion” does not consider 
the aspect of ruling structures31. 
“Totalitarianism” as “Permanent Revolution”
Sigmund Neumann (1904–1962), an almost forgotten German-American scholar, did 
avoid this problem as well as other ones in his concept. Th e research on dictatorships 
was dominated by the analytical fi gure Totalitarianism during the 1920s and 30s as 
well as during the Cold War, as is well-known. In the fi rst phase, emigrants like Luigi 
Sturzo, Hannah Arendt32, Franz Borkenau33, Paul Tillich, Waldemar Gurian and many 
others34 brought the perception of the paradigm to Anglo-American world35. For an 
entire generation of intellectuals, the theory of totalitarianism was rooted in the “phy-
sical threat of death and its existential turn in criticism”36.
Not so for Sigmund Neumann37. In his perspective, totalitarianism merely was 
a “political chameleon” in a time of transition. Th at’s why he argued against the wide-
30 H.U. Wehler, Nationalismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, München 2001, p. 32.
31 It might be “of little help to use the idea of ‘political religion’ to describe the claims to rule and the rul-
ing practices of the Th ird Reich, especially since an inner logic and consistency is suggested, which the sys-
tem lacks.” Quoted according to Hans Mommsen, Der Nationalsozialismus als säkulare Religion, in: Zwischen 
„nationaler Revolution” und militärischer Aggression, p. 53, in contrast: J.H. Schoeps, Erlösungswahn und 
Vernichtungswille. Die so genannte „Endlösung der Judenfrage” als Vision und Programm des Nationalsozialismus, 
in: Der Nationalsozialismus als politische Religion, idem, M. Ley (eds.), Bodenheim 1997.
32 Cf. G. Besier, Who was Hannah Arendt?, in: Kirke, protestantisme og samfumm. Festskrift  til professor dr. 
Ingun Montgomery, J. Roger, D. Th orkildsen, A.V. Tonnessen (eds.), Trondheim 2006, pp. 297–308; G. Besier, 
K. Stokłosa, A. Wisely (eds.), Totalitarianism and Liberty. Hannah Arendt in the 21st Century, Kraków 2008, esp. 
pp. 101–123.
33 Cf. B. Lange-Enzmann, Franz Borkenau als politischer Denker, Berlin 1996.
34 Cf., e.g., G. Besier, Hans Ansgar Reinhold (1897–1968): a forgotten theologian in American exile, in: Exile 
and Patronage. Cross-cultural negotiations beyond the Th ird Reich, A. Chandler, K. Stokłosa, J. Vinzent (eds.), 
Münster 2006, pp. 109–125.
35 A. Söllner, Das Totalitarismuskonzept in der Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Totalitarismus. 
Eine Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, idem, R. Walkenhaus, K. Wieland (eds.), Berlin 1997, pp. 10–21. For 
a history of the developments of research in detail, see: B. Seidel, S. Jenkner (eds.), Wege der Totalitarismus-
Forschung, Darmstadt 1968; M. Jänicke, Totalitäre Herrschaft . Anatomie eines politischen Begriff s, Berlin 1971; 
W. Schlangen, Die Totalitarismus-Th eorie. Entwicklung und Probleme, Stuttgart 1976; E. Jesse (ed.), Totalitarismus 
im 20. Jahrhundert; Baden-Baden 1996; M.-P. Möll, Gesellschaft  und totalitäre Ordnung. Eine theoriegeschichtliche 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Totalitarismus, Baden-Baden 1998; A. Siegel (ed.), Totalitarismustheorien nach dem 
Ende des Kommunismus, Köln 1998.
36 A. Söllner, Das Totalitarismuskonzept in der Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in:  Totalitarismus. Eine 
Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, idem, R. Walkenhaus, K. Wieland (eds.), Berlin 1997, pp. 10–21; here: p. 18.
37 See P. Lösche, S. Neumann, in: Deutsche Historiker, Göttingen 1989, pp. 82–100; K. Dietrich Bracher, pref-
ace to: S. Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik (1932), 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 7–12; A. Söllner, 
Sigmund Neumann’s „Permanent Revolution”. Ein vergessener Klassiker der vergleichenden Diktaturforschung, in: 
Totalitarismus, 53–73; G. Besier, Totalitarianism as a „political chameleon” in a time of transition – Th e analy-
sis of Sigmund Neumann (1904–1962), in: „Totalitarismus und Demokratie/Totalitarianism and Democracy. 
Zeitschrift  für Internationale Diktatur- und Freiheitsforschung/An International Journal for the Study of 
Dictatorships and Liberty” 5 (2008), pp. 115–126.
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spread paradigm of Totalitarianism – also for methodological reasons. Th e applica-
tion of comparative social science is a method of central signifi cance to Neumann’s 
analyses – a procedure which is more interested in the genesis of a phenomenon than 
its current form, and one which also brings out the diff erences between the various 
dictatorships of the 20th century. In his ground-breaking volume entitled Permanent 
Revolution. Th e Total State in a World at War, which was published in 194238, Sigmund 
Neumann went in the face of the prevailing consensus of the anti-Hitler coalition, 
in that he fully integrated the USSR – an ally of the USA in the ongoing war – into 
his dictatorship comparison. A posthumous second edition of Permanent Revolution 
was published twenty-three years later. Important seem Neumann’s warning that one 
should be careful in one’s diff erentiation between the various autocracies: “Even the 
modern autocracies […] are worlds apart from one another […]. But in actual fact, 
signifi cant and numerous as their structural similarities and common human traits 
are, the dynamic movements of our day – the awakening nationalism of the Near East, 
Latin-American one-man rule, Far Eastern neo-feudalism [...], Russia’s Bolshevism, 
even German National Socialism and Italian Fascism – must be diff erentiated in time 
and space. Th ey have their distinct national climate. Th ey arrive from a specifi c his-
torical background. [...] Hence a full defi nition of modern dictatorship must include 
this diversity with all its shades and confl icting aims. Any sweeping formula should 
therefore be regarded with suspicion”39.
Neumann is convinced that the modern dictatorships “have changed radically 
since their inception”40. In his view this necessitates the study of the transformation of 
dictatorships and the comparison of the various stages of totalitarian development – 
both within a dictatorship and between various dictatorships. Th is call for a detailed 
analysis of specifi c changes was not only referring to dictatorships in Germany, Italy 
and the Soviet Union, but also to regimes in countries such as Yugoslavia, Poland 
and China. Neumann comes to the conclusion that: “Th is very fact may call for 
greater hesitancy in making quick generalizations towards an all-inclusive theory of 
totalitarianism”41.
In his unpublished essay Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism (1962), Sigmund 
Neumann describes the fundamental sequences of totalitarianism interpretation. 
Bolshevism was initially understood by the Western world as a singular, abnormal 
phenomenon “resultant of strange historical circumstances of national traditions and 
38 S. Neumann, Permanent Revolution. Th e Total State in a World at War, New York–London 1942. A post-
humous second edition of Permanent Revolution was published twenty three years later in 1963. Up until his 
death Neumann had been working on a preface (of which there were two versions) and a new chapter (Toward 
a Th eory of Totalitarianism). Hans Kohn, who released the posthumous 2nd edition, did not include Neumann’s 
new sections. He did, nonetheless, change the subtitle of the work according to Neumann’s suggestion, which 
therefore saw it become Totalitarianism in the Age of International Cicil War. 
39 S. Neumann, Permanent Revolution, ix.
40 S. Neumann, Preface I, in: Sigmund Neumann Papers, File „Permanent Revolution”, „Deutsches Exilarchiv 
1933–1945”, Frankfurt am Main (within the German National Library).
41 Ibidem. Th e last sentence is almost identical to a corresponding sentence in Preface II, ibidem.
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misfortunes of defeat”42, a temporary episode not worthy of any in-depth analysis. It 
was only the rise of the Central European dictatorships which, “partly in response to 
the Soviet challenge”43, made the “Soviet matter” interesting to “civilized society”. Th e 
various interpretations of this historic phenomenon which followed over a period of 
decades “were more a mirror of the changing times than of the nature of the matter 
in dispute”44.
Th e fi rst explanation off ered by Neumann for the rise of dictatorships is the psy-
choanalytical paradigm, which is to falsify it straight away. Th e neuroses of the leading 
protagonists did not account for these “one man rules” to a suffi  cient extent. Th e next, 
historic attempt at an explanation took the characteristic mass basis of the movements 
as its starting point, and saw the developing dictatorships as the natural response of 
a proud nation which had lost the First World War and been humiliated by its victors. 
Yet this explanation is not accurate, at least not in the case of the USSR, though one 
could perhaps say that Lenin used Russia’s defeat in the imperialist war as the ideal 
basis for a radical coup. Th is hypothesis also created the connection between war and 
revolution. 
Although Neumann found this humiliation theory unconvincing, it had brought 
about a predominant mood of appeasement amongst the victorious Anglo-American 
countries during the 1930s. People felt guilty and tended towards concessions – par-
ticularly as the National Self-determination slogan came from the ideological reper-
toire of the Western democratic countries. Th e toleration of annexations carried out 
by the USSR – for instance in the Baltic – were seen by the Western powers as an op-
portunity to appease and neutralize the potential revolutionary threat posed by both 
the USSR and the fascist regimes by making territorial concessions.
It was only by the end of the 1930s, by which time the dictatorships had con-
solidated and set about spreading themselves across the continent, that the Western 
powers began to deliberate upon the issue of which of the dictatorships was the lesser 
evil. Left -wing intellectuals had labelled fascism the “last stage of capitalism”. Fascism 
and National Socialism turned this slogan into a positive, referring to themselves as 
“bulwarks against the Red Peril”. As the USSR regarded the fascist dictatorships as 
the last stage of capitalism even before the dawn of the socialist revolution, and the 
Western conservatives tolerated these dictatorships as a bulwark against communism, 
both National Socialism and fascism were able to spread further in the shadow of 
these images. 
Th e military successes of these dictatorships – initially on the part of the National 
Socialists, and then on the part of the Soviet Union – led to the extremely fl atter-
ing wording of “totalitarianism as an effi  ciency [sic!] state of master organizers and 
propagandists”45. According to Neumann, even serious students of behavioural sci-
ences in the United States were impressed by the powerful protagonists’ ability to 
42 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, p. 9, Sigmund Neumann Papers, File Permanent 
Revolution, ibidem.
43 Ibidem.
44 Ibidem, p. 10.
45 Ibidem, p. 14.
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even be able to mobilize mass support in the occupied states. Indeed, the fascist move-
ment fascinated not only a large portion of Europe, but also those across the Atlantic. 
In 1927 the Americans associated dictatorships with Italian conditions and Il Duce. 
Mussolini seemed to have had such positive charisma in the USA (power, effi  ciency, 
modernity, control and erotic appeal), that Studebaker named its EU Standard Six-
model “dictator” and was still able to sell 40,000 of the cars.
In Neumann’s view, once the Th ird Reich had collapsed the Western victorious 
powers took to interpreting the totalitarian German state as a mysterious quirk of 
the German national character. Th e Germans were labelled abnormal and attempts 
were made to ban them from the international scene or to place them in quarantine 
under a military leadership. Essentially one wanted to strike up again from the point 
where the dictatorship had interrupted “normal” proceedings. Th e triumphal impres-
sion that such a development would never be able to happen on their soil took root 
amongst the victorious Anglo-Americans. A far-sighted line from Neumann com-
ments on this stage of dictatorship analysis: “Serious students, however, from the out-
set realized that totalitarianism was not and could not be defeated on the battlefi eld”46.
Neumann delineates three post-War approaches to totalitarianism according to 
their methodology: “An existentialist theory, very much in tune with a prevailing 
mood of the aft ermath, was probing more deeply into human condition which had 
brought about the origins of totalitarianism and revealed many insights into mod-
ern man’s predicament”47. He names Hannah Arendt as an excellent example of this 
paradigm, suggesting that her originally British title Th e burden of our time48 is a good 
introduction to this type of interpretation. Nevertheless, he rejects this concept as 
unconvincing: “Vis-a-vis such radical destruction of the world around us, it seems 
indeed understandable to retreat to the inner core of individual conscience as the 
last defence and only redeeming force of naked existence. Yet such an interpretation, 
while quite persuasive and potent on a personal plane, does not comprehend the his-
torical complexity and the social reality of the phenomenon itself. Above all, it hardly 
applies to the most critical antagonist of our time, the USSR, nor does it grasp the 
revolutionary dynamics of evolving Red China and the still groping forces of newly 
developing nations”49. 
Neumann does not see it as a coincidence that during the post-War period – for 
him “a lull period for imaginative thinking and theoretical insights”50 – totalitarian-
ism could only be portrayed as a syndrome of interrelated characteristics. He names 
the work of Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski as an example of such 
a concept51. “Friedrich-Brzezinski’s cluster analysis rightly refl ects and records the 
substantive progress of diff erentiated research in the fi eld, yet such a careful catalogue 
46 Ibidem, p. 16.
47 Ibidem.
48 Hannah Arendt originally named her book not Th e Origins of Totalitarianism but Th e Burden of Our Time 
(London 1951).
49 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, p. 17.
50 Ibidem, p. 18.
51 Cf. C.J. Friedrich, Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Cambridge/Mass. 1956.
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obviously cannot answer the quest for a full comprehension of the phenomenon’s in-
trinsic nature”52.
Th e concept of modernization as the key to the explanation of totalitarianism 
moves the most recent advancements of the mature Soviet model into focus and ex-
plains its attractiveness to developing countries. Centrally-planned socio-economic 
transformations of this pace and radical nature can be enticing when compared with 
the slow, strenuous change processes witnessed in democratic states. “Th e dictator’s 
directed eff orts can surely lead to short-cut solutions which in their immediate and 
impressive achievements let their followers forget the price to be paid and leave their 
opponents crippled in their self-confi dence to remain masters […]”53. In Neumann’s 
view it is nonetheless naïve to believe in an automatic transfer ranging from economi-
cal development to a political modernity featuring public participation and civil re-
sponsibility. “Neither does the search for modernity lead the royal road to guaranteed 
democracy nor is this speed-up drive for economic development the one and only 
expression of modern totalitarianism”54. 
Nonetheless, Neumann states that all of the theorems mentioned – for a particular 
phase in the development of totalitarianism – included an element of truth. Th at’s 
very similar to Roger Griffi  n’s plea for a cluster model55. Yet Neumann also notes that 
all blinkered explanations are dangerous and lead to confusion if they are taken as the 
whole truth. Neumann sees the “totalitarianism” theorem as a “political chameleon”56, 
which, in his view, is best labelled as “permanent revolution”. In 1962 Neumann spoke 
of the modern dictatorships as “total, demagogic, institutionalized and driven to un-
limited expansion”57. According to him, the limitlessness of modern dictatorships in 
terms of time and space diff erentiates them from the classical Roman dictatorships 
through to the dictatorships of the 18th and 19th centuries. […]”58. Neumann writes 
that, in contrast with earlier revolts, Lenin linked the romantic idea of a revolution 
with an academic concept, thereby turning revolution into a rational matter and rais-
ing it to a new level. Prerequisites for modern revolutions include the existence of 
wide social classes which are not integrated into the existing society and therefore 
constitute the raw material for a movement “promising them a new haven of commu-
nal existence”59. Th e demi-god’s appeal to these classes makes him into their spokes-
person and charismatic leader. According to Neumann, the successful implantation 
of a dictatorial system requires the execution of further transformation processes aft er 
the seizure of power. He describes the fi rst step as the targeted destruction of plural-
ist society, which is then to be replaced by a “new order” which brings “conformity 
52 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, p. 18.
53 Ibidem, p. 19.
54 Ibidem, pp. 19 f.
55 R. Griffi  n, God’s Counterfeiters?, in: Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion, idem (ed.), London 
2005, p. 21.
56 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, p. 21.
57 Ibidem, p. 22.
58 Ibidem.
59 Ibidem, p. 24.
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on all levels of social existence (Gleichschaltung)”60. Th e mobilization of the masses is 
indispensable to this new order61; the masses are to receive the impression that they 
are participating in the political system “in some ways in an even more active man-
ner than democratic systems which rely on the free interplay of competing social 
forces”62. Th e survival of modern dictatorships is linked to a further highly-signifi cant 
factor: “Modern dictatorships, autocratic as they may be, have to fulfi l the social needs 
of security, material welfare and spiritual belonging for their mass following if they 
expect any degree of permanence”63. We have learned from analyses of the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc that these dictatorships were not in a position to satisfy the material 
and spiritual needs of their followers on a sustained basis. In describing modern dic-
tatorships as “post-democratic” Neumann brings both systems close together: “[…] 
one ought to recognize that both rival systems belong to the same historical era”64. 
Th is means that both systems must provide answers to problems and questions com-
mon to them. In Neumann’s view both democracies and dictatorships feature leaders 
and followers. Yet the diff erence lies in the specifi c selection, character and functions 
of the competing institutions. Th e decisive diff erence is that a dictatorship institu-
tionalizes revolution. Th is makes it total: it seeks to pervade every fi bre of society. Th e 
body with the most important role if this total pervasion of society is to be achieved 
is the party machine65. When Neumann draws parallels between Dictatorship and 
democracy this may remind us, that aft er the collapse of Communism some social 
scientists are talking about a decreasing of democracies, too. 
It is his multifactorial and multi-dynamic point which diff erentiates Neumann 
from other totalitarianism theorists. It is this concept which enables him to also in-
clude theorems from other thinkers as validating elements in his much more complex 
concept. Th is explains his distinctly constructive discursive style when compared with 
his peers. On the 30th of November 1949 Sigmund Neumann wrote to Carl Joachim 
Friedrich: “I hope that our discussion was useful for you and your group. It was most 
assuring to fi nd that in spite of our all too infrequent get-togethers we seem to agree 
on the fundamentals”66. “Fundamentals” here is presumably less about methodical 
and methodological processes regarding the research subject than the common plat-
form both took as their base: the conviction that free democracy is the form of politi-
cal order which is to be defended and secured.
In order to stress this point of view, Neumann favours “defi nition by contrast” in 
the form of comparative analysis of “constitutional democracy” and “totalitarianism”. 
He states that the modern ideological war between systems sees the opponents ap-
propriating each other’s ideas and concepts; these are then ideologically bent, as the 
60 Ibidem, p. 25.
61 One of the more recent theories to explain why crowds seem to act together is the emergent-norm theory 
by Turner & Kilian (1987). Cf. W. Heitmeyer, J. Hagan (eds.), Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung, 
Opladen 2002, pp. 1465 ff . (English: Th e International Handbook of Violence Research, 2003).
62 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, pp. 25 f.
63 Ibidem, p. 26.
64 Ibidem. 
65 Ibidem, p. 28.
66 Sigmund Neumann Papers, File S. Neumann’s Letters 1949–1961.
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example of the people’s democracies had already shown. “A comparative confronta-
tion alone can articulate their true character and clash in our time. [...] It defi nes the 
opposing camps in a threefold approach: political, sociological and ideological, by 
addressing itself to the crucial questions of their source and scope of power, their 
divergent interrelations of leaders and followers, and their contrasting concepts of 
man in this triple involvement on the international, national and personal plane”67. 
Neumann suggests a bipolar model very similar to the most recent models, with ex-
treme democracy on the one hand and totalitarianism on the other68.
67 S. Neumann, Toward a Th eory of Totalitarianism, p. 34.
68 See W. Merkel, Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Th eorie und Empirie der Transformations-
forschung, Opladen 1999, p. 55.
